Showing posts with label law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label law. Show all posts

Friday, 12 February 2016

Let’s not muddle the conversion issue in Deepa's case

I have kept silent about the recent Federal Court's decision in Deepa v. Izwan. There really was nothing for me to say. But this piece by Datuk Zainul Rijal prompted me to write something, because it skirts around the elephant in the room.

I will write in English because I want this to come out as soon as possible. If I can manage, I will write and expand this in BM, because what I want to say should be said in BM as well.

Disclosure: Zainul Rijal is a Facebook friend. I first knew of him some years ago when I wrote to him personally on another issue (can't remember what) relating to Islam in Malaysia. We don't see eye to eye on the topic. But we have, I believe, mutual respect for each other. So please don't think this is a bash-Zainul-Rijal piece. It is not.

His explanation – at paragraphs three and four of his piece – of section 51 and the position (or rather non-position) of the Muslim convert in family matters in the civil court is accurate. The main point he makes in the article is that the convert has rights too, and that has been overlooked, and the solution would be to establish a tribunal where judges from both the civil and shariah jurisdiction can sit and rule on cases such as Deepa's.

In the past, I would have agreed to and supported such a proposal. It's quite a win-win solution.
But now, I propose a simpler solution.

Conversion to Islam, in Malaysia, has to be done at the appropriate state authority and there will be the requisite registration so that there would be no doubt as to the status of the convert's religion. An extra step that can be done to ensure fairness is this: before a conversion is officially registered, the parents (if the convert is not married), or the spouse and children (if the convert is married), should be required by law to be informed of the proposed conversion and be allowed to make representations or objections, and all pending issues must be sorted out before the (proposed) convert is allowed to convert.

There can even be an out-of-court agreement between all parties if there is any urgency to the conversion taking place (for example if the convert is dying and wishes to die as a Muslim), and this agreement can be formally recognised at the civil and shariah courts later when ancillary issues have to be settled.

My solution merely adds an extra step in the administrative process. It is cheaper and faster than establishing a tribunal. And it forces all parties to deal with reality, i.e. the person wishes to convert, and that is that.

Faith is a powerful thing. It should not produce misery and heartache. Children being separated and growing up away from their parents is not right (not when there is nothing other than religion being used as a reason for the separation).

Fair is fair. Just is just. Let's not muddle the issue. – February 12, 2016.

*Jason Kay is a lawyer practicing in Malacca.


My thoughts on unilateral conversion of minors, in 2013 — http://jasonkaykl.blogspot.my/2013/07/unilateral-conversion-of-minors-to.html

Wednesday, 10 February 2016

Using the iPad in your legal practice — 2016 update

iPad, sidduz, FlickrIt has been over 3 years since I wrote this piece – http://jasonkaykl.blogspot.my/2012/08/using-ipad-in-your-legal-practice.html – I feel an update is in order. What I want to convey is merely what has worked for me, and what hasn't. Let's start with the apps I've been using regularly for work.

For emails, I am still using the native MAIL app but now in tandem with INBOX BY GMAIL. The reason I use the second app is because I need its "defer till later" function which allows me to put aside unimportant emails which will reappear in my inbox later in the day, the next day, the weekend, or to a specific date and time, or (and this is cool but not really useful for me) to a time when I arrive at a particular place (this is useful when I need, say, a batch of emails to reappear in my inbox when I arrive at a particular location for a meeting).

My calendar is still the native CALENDAR app mostly. But since my phone is an Android, I also have the GOOGLE CALENDAR app running because the "schedule" view totally works for me.

For word processing, I use the native NOTES app for quick pieces since basic formatting is now available. I will only use PAGES when the need arises to edit the raw text since anything pasted into PAGES is pasted as raw text, while formatting is maintained when you paste into NOTES. I have not used the MICROSOFT WORD app after trying it out for a month or two. But it is a good app. When collaborating with other lawyers, I use GOOGLE DOCS because it allows for realtime editing with collaborators and we can leave comments for each other. This speeds up work tremendously.

When preparing cases, I work mainly with scanned PDF of my files – annotating them to remind myself of salient points in each case file. I still use PDF EXPERT. It is, to me, the best app on my iPad. For organising the development for each case file, I use EVERNOTE and devote 3 notes (usually) per file – chronology, examination-in-chief/cross-examination flow/questions, and the submission flow. Each case file gets a specific name, and I do not create individual folders for each case file. What I do is use tags to remind me what each case is about, for e.g. statute, court, active or closed case file, area of law, and anything that will help me tap into research already done when preparing a future case. I use the tag function as guideposts.

To convert photos to PDF, I use SCANNER PRO, and I have PDF PRINTER on standby to convert web pages to pdf (this can also be done with the 'save to PDF in iBooks' function now available on the latest iOS).

I still use DROPBOX and GOOGLE DRIVE for my cloud storage needs. iCloud is on by default.

For instant messaging, I have WHATSAPP and TELEGRAM on the phone, and TELEGRAM on the iPad. Having Telegram on both the iPad and phone is liberating because there is the option of typing out longer messages (and it's easier to proofread on the iPad), sending it to myself via Telegram, and then forward to others via WhatsApp (which is the preferred app for most of the people on my contact list). There is less chance of typographical errors. I also use ZELLO on occasion – usually when coordinating large events or outings.

As part of my continuing education, TED talks are still a staple. I use the YOUTUBE app. Channels that I find particularly good are The RSA and The School Of Life.

New things that I currently use: IKEA's ISBERGET tablet stand. Cheap, and works brilliantly when I'm conducting a case at court.

Things/Apps that I do not use anymore: The stylus. iPad works best with fingers. That is its magic. As for all the other apps that I mentioned in the first article but not in this, I don't/rarely use them anymore.

And this article? Written on the iPad with the 2-thumb typing method, and final editing using a laptop.

Explore the apps mentioned in the article:-
Jason Kay is a lawyer residing in Melaka.  His interests include legal aid (YBGK) (Bar Council LegalAid Centres) and war crimes (Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal).  He blogs at Open Letters, and tweets @JK_mlk

Saturday, 6 June 2015

#9 | Things I Learnt This Week (That I Want To Share) #9

1. CHRISTIANITY | ETHICS | MEDICAL ETHICS
“God did give us reason. He gave us minds in order to understand the world, to understand options and to make real decisions. He didn’t give us reason to create our own world and to create our own authority structures and our own conception of morality. 
Here’s a book [Proverbs] that talks a lot about the use of one’s mind, the use of one’s reasoning, the observation and coming to conclusions based upon those observations. But the whole point of that wisdom we are to gain is that we understand ourselves by living in a world we didn’t make and living within a moral order that someone else, namely God, has put into place. 
That’s the proper context for our reason to be exercised. God’s given fish the ability to swim, but they need to swim within water.”
The Science of Life

2. LIFE | WOMEN 

A poignant and wonderful short animation on a woman's life.

Sidewalk (Official Version) - [VIDEO]

3. LAW | PRISON | REHABILITATION 
"It isn't every day that prison officials would call up a journalist to help seek the release of a prisoner, whom they feel has transformed himself into a model citizen."
Hope within the prison walls - Wong Chun Wai

Curated by,
Jason Kay
Melaka
06 June 2015

Friday, 22 May 2015

#8 | Things I Learnt This Week (That I Want To Share) #8

1. LAW | SYARIAH | HUDUD

This is an excellent quote. 
"I have said this before and I wish to say it again: God’s laws are perfect, but when men are called to draft the laws and push them through the legislative process, then they become man’s laws. This means that we as a civilised community must scrutinise and deliberate these man-made laws carefully before allowing them to come into effect. We owe it to Muslims to craft laws that are just and that can be implemented fairly, and to do that, we cannot exclude the community from providing their views.
...
Never again must we be led like sheep by those who use God’s name to hide their own incompetence and ignorance."
The price of a human life - Zaid Ibrahim

2. SEX | EDUCATION | RAPE

Understanding the concept of informed consent before engaging in sex, using tea as an analogy.

Sex, consent, tea

3. PRODUCTIVITY

Priming yourself for great work.
"The “Meez,” as professionals call it, translates into “everything in its place.” In practice, it involves studying a recipe, thinking through the tools and equipment you will need, and assembling the ingredients in the right proportion before you begin. It is the planning phase of every meal—the moment when chefs evaluate the totality of what they are trying to achieve and create an action plan for the meal ahead."
How to Spend the First 10 Minutes of Your Day

Curated by,
Jason Kay
Melaka
22 May 2015



Saturday, 4 April 2015

On Hudud - yes, I’m finally writing something on it (sorta)

1. I have read the Malaysian Bar President's press statement of 20/3/2015 titled "Hudud is Unconstitutional, Discriminatory and Divisive". I agree with it.

2. I have read the letter/article by Fatihah Jamhari titled "Answering the Malaysian Bar on the hudud". I disagree with the analysis.

3. I have read the keynote address of the ex-Chief Justice, Abdul Hamid Mohamad, given at a seminar titled, "Implementation of the Islamic Criminal Law (hudud, qisas, ta'zir) in Malaysia - Prospects and Challenges" on 01/4/2015.

He was the judge who wrote the decision in the Federal Court case of Latifah Mat Zin v. Rosmawati Sharibun [2007] 5 CLJ 253. He has expanded on that judgment in this keynote address.

I am glad that he has highlighted salient points on the issue, which I will reproduce here. They elegantly go to the heart of the matter.

They are (the very important parts are in bold):-

3A. 'Do not misunderstand and think that "criminal law" is under federal jurisdiction, while the "Islamic criminal law" is under the jurisdiction of the state. The Constitution only allows the State Legislature to enact laws for offences committed by persons professing the religion of Islam against the precepts of Islam, even then if it is not in respect of matters included in the Federal List, that is, "criminal law".'

3B. 'Before Merdeka there was no "religion of the Federation". In fact, the Malay Rulers objected to UMNO’s proposal to make Islam the official religion of the Federation. ... religious matters which fell under the jurisdiction of the states were limited to family law. In most states, there were no Syari’ah courts then. It was under those circumstances that provisions regarding criminal law and offences against precepts if Islam were enacted. Thus, criminal law is placed under federal jurisdiction."

3C. 'Both the Federal Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly may not make law with regard to matters under the jurisdiction of the other.'

3D. 'offences that have existed in the Penal Code since 1936 and in force when the Federal Constitution was enacted, for example, causing of death to others, theft, robbery, rape and causing injury to other persons, necessarily fall within the words "criminal law" used by the drafters of the Constitution. If not, what else is "criminal law"?'

3E. 'among the hudud offences, there are "criminal law" offences provided for in the Penal Code while others are not. ... For example, adultery, accusing another person of committing adultery and offences associated with consumption of alcoholic drinks. It is arguable that such offences are not "criminal law".'

3F. 'if hudud punishments were to be imposed for federal offenses, it can only be done as a federal law, that is, as “criminal law”, not as "offences relating to precepts of Islam"

... Parliament may choose whatever punishment for any criminal offence, including punishments in accordance with Shari’ah. The law would apply to Muslims and non-Muslims. As criminal law it is under the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Civil Court has jurisdiction over Muslims and non-Muslims. ... This situation may be compared to the law on Islamic banking and finance and takaful.'

... 'it should be emphasised that the federal criminal law must apply to all Muslims and non-Muslims because it is a general and not a private law and offenses provided for in the State List. If it is made applicable only to Muslims, it contravenes the provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution because it is discriminatory on ground only of religion and therefore unconstitutional, null and void.'

... 'with regard to offenses that are not provided for in the Penal Code or any other federal law, but have already been provided for in the Syari’ah Criminal Law Enactment States, they may be made hadud offenses under state law if the existing obstacle is removed. The obstacle is not a constitutional obstacle but an obstacle by federal law that limits the punishments that could be provided in the state law and given jurisdiction to the Syari’ah Court. That law is the Syari’ah Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1965. If the Federal Government is willing to amend the act to allow the State Legislature to impose hudud punishment, the State Legislative Assembly may make such a law. As the law is a state law under List II of the Ninth Schedule (State List) it applies only to Muslims and falls under the jurisdiction of the Syari’ah Court. There is no constitutional issue here.'

3G. 'If we do that, the effect will be that some hudud offences would be a federal criminal law that applies to all Muslims and non-Muslims and tried by the Civil Court. Besides, there will also be hudud offences which are under the state law that only applies to Muslims and administered by Syari’ah Court. Should we have such laws? I leave it to you to answer for yourself.'

3H. 'In Malaysia, any law made must be in compliance with the Federal Constitution. ... if the State Legislature makes it applicable also to non-Muslims, the law is unconstitutional, null and void. Syari’ah Court has no jurisdiction over non-Muslims. If the State Legislative Assembly makes a law to empower the Syari’ah Court to try non-Muslims, the law is also unconstitutional, null and void.'

3I. 'we often hear people saying that such offences will only be made applicable to Muslims. It is only partly right. ... with regard to federal criminal offenses, such offenses are not personal law or “offences relating to the precepts of Islam" ... It is a public law. That's why prosecution is done by the Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the country. ... if the law imposing hudud punishments for criminal offences under federal jurisdiction apply to Muslims only, it is inconsistent with Article 8 of the Federal Constitution and, therefore unconstitutional, null and void.'

3J. The speech then goes into a discussion of Article 76A of the Federal Constitution and how it impacts the Syariah Criminal Code (II) Enactment 1993 (Kelantan) as well as the Syari’ah Criminal Code (II) (1993) 2015 Enactment. The discussion is excellent.

3K. He then suggests 2 possible 'solutions' within the existing framework of the Constitution. But he is emphatic when saying,

'Whether the first or the second option is chosen, it is not a satisfactory solution. From the legal and administrative perspective, it will create new problems that did not exist before. Do not blame the Constitution for it. The Constitution does not envisage such things. It clearly divides the jurisdiction over criminal law and jurisdiction over offences against the precepts of Islam. The problem arises when the State Government tries to take over the legislative power over criminal offences that lie under the Federal jurisdiction. That is the root cause of the problem.'

3L. His conclusion is sagely, and full of humility. I reproduce it in full here:

'With respect, on the issue of hudud, I find that there is a lot of confusion regarding the law and the implementation. We should be able to differentiate the discussion regarding the law and discussion regarding the implementation. What we are discussing now is the implementation. We are not questioning the law. To raise issues that should be considered in the implementation is not challenging the law. Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Kattab suspended the implementation of hudud during a famine. No one accused him of challenging hudud and challenging God’s law. He only decided that, in that situation, at that time, it was not suitable, indeed it would lead to injustice if the application of hudud were to be continued. So, he suspended its application. Remember, hudud is only a means, not the end. The end is justice. Something similar happened in Pakistan in our time. When the Hudood Ordinance was enacted in 1979, the offence of rape was made a hudud offence. Subsequently, there were cases of injustice to victims of rape who became pregnant as a result of it and who could not produce the required number of witnesses ending in being convicted for adultery. In 2006, the offence of rape was removed from the Hudood Ordinance and placed under the Penal Code again and tried by the Civil Court, until now. I am aware that my speech may disappoint many people. But, if you want to hear my honest opinion about the reality from the perspective of the Constitution and the law, that is it. Borrowing the words of Imam Abu Hanifah, "This is only my opinion. If there is a better argument follow it.” I would add, “If there is a better argument, I too will follow it.”'

4. I urge you to read his speech in full. It is a wise analysis of the issue.

Jason Kay
Melaka

04 April 2015

Friday, 6 March 2015

Things I Learnt This Week (That I Want To Share) #1

Oversharing has become a curse with social media available 24/7. This realisation hit me hard over the CNY 2015 break. Our minds are stretched and moulded by reacting, rather than contemplating; by sound bytes instead of reflecting in context. 

So I embark on this project: One post, at the end of each week, of the things that caught my eye, and engaged my mind, curated, for your consideration because I think they are worth your time. 

It is not altruism. It's me disciplining myself to look for the wheat and let go the chaff. Since I'm already benefitting from it, there is no harm sharing my discoveries with you. And so I do. Do drop by once a week, and hopefully, you won't be disappointed. 

=============

Things I Learnt This Week (That I Want To Share) #1
#tiltwtiwts

1. SCIENCE

"experiments show that when people’s beliefs are threatened, they often take flight to a land where facts do not matter. In scientific terms, their beliefs become less “falsifiable” because they can no longer be tested scientifically for verification or refutation.
...
With the disease of bias, then, societal immunity is better achieved when we encourage people to accept ambiguity, engage in critical thinking, and reject strict ideology."

Why People "Fly from Facts"


2. LAW

I've always been fascinated with Qisas (http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qisas) and Diyya (http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diyya) in the death penalty discussion. I am generally anti death penalty, but I still don't have the answer to this excellent pro death penalty point: "If you oppose the death penalty, you are really just saying that no matter what horrible things a man does to another/other human beings, you guarantee him the most precious thing he has, his life." [If you can identity the source of this point, please let me know so I can credit it accordingly.]

Even the late Karpal Singh, a staunch anti death penalty lawyer, did have a different view in cases of child rape - http://www.thesundaily.my/node/140082

We may not have the stomach for an eye for an eye taken literally - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/eye-for-an-eye-iran-blinds-man-who-carried-out-acid-attack

But the slap on the wrist sentence given to Anders Breivik http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anders_Behring_Breivik offends me greatly. 


3. FUNNY | SOCIETY | LAW

Jim Jefferies - gun control


Curated by,
Jason Kay
Melaka
06 March 2015

Sunday, 25 January 2015

The "Allah issue" in Malaysia, a comment (as at Jan 25, 2015)

This is a decent recap and epilogue to the "Allah issue" saga. 

For me to write anything of length is a waste of time. So I'll keep it short. 

1. It would seem that there is indeed a difference with how the word "Allah" can be used in Peninsular Malaysia as opposed to Sabah & Sarawak. Legally, I can see how this is possible. Sabah & Sarawak has a special position in the Federation of Malaysia. This point, therefore, makes sense. 

2. The point about Article 4(4) Federal Constitution is also valid, i.e. "proceedings for a declaration that a law is invalid on the ground mentioned in Clause (3) ... shall not be commenced without the LEAVE of a JUDGE of the FEDERAL COURT; and the Federation SHALL be entitled to be a party to any such proceedings, and so shall any STATE that would or might be a party ..."

Procedurally, the argument that there was a flaw in the Catholic Church's suit is sound. The other pending cases would probably fail for this reason as well. 

3. Unfortunately, the issue is still stuck in limbo. We are certain that "Allah" cannot be used by the publication "The Herald" and that the 10-point solution has not been rescinded. That's it.

Here's the cheeky possibility: What if the Catholic Church applies for a permit to publish "Herald 2"? Issuance (if any) of the permit will most certainly contain the same condition that the word "Allah" cannot be used. The Church then files another suit in court, this time following the proper procedure. The court is again asked to decide. We're back to square one. 

So, would the Catholic Church in Malaysia do that? 
Part of me hope it does. I fervently believe with my intellect that Christians have a historical, linguistic and theological right to use the term "Allah". 
Another part of me hope it doesn't because there has been an "undisclosed understanding" that has been reached on a "gentlemen basis" and that "understanding" will be kept hereon forth to maintain the peace, and the unique Malaysian way of life. 

4. Lest we forget, Christians in Malaysia still have churches. We can still worship freely. We are not being persecuted to the point where we are killed, unlike in other parts of the world. This is a blessing. 

The only legal impediment we have is that we are not allowed to carry out the Great Commission fully. But then, we are to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's. We have never questioned the wisdom of Article 11(4) Federal Constitution. 

We can still, within our slightly limited capacity, be the salt and light for Malaysia, as is our duty. 

If you wish to read further:-  
for "The Great Commission," see http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Commission, 
for "Render unto Caesar," see http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Render_unto_Caesar, 

And that's all I have to say about that.
Life has to go on. 

I wish you well. 
I wish you peace. 

Jason Kay 
Melaka
25 Jan 2015

Thursday, 18 December 2014

The Tangkak Hymnal case - December 2014

OVERVIEW:-
The Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM), in early December 2014, seized 31 hymnals titled, "Mari Kita Memuji Allah Kita," from Cyril Mannayagam, a Catholic priest in Tangkak, Johor. 

"Johor deputy CID chief Assistant Commissioner Dennis Lim said the case was being investigated under Section 298A of the Penal Code for causing disharmony, disunity, or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will on grounds of religion."

THE LAW:-
Section 298A - The then Supreme Court in Mamat Daud [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 197 did rule, by a majority of 3-2 (majority decision of Salleh Abas LP, George Seah, and Mohd Azmi, with Hashim Yeop Sani and Eusoffe Abdoolcader dissenting) that section 298A of the Penal Code is INVALID and therefore NULL and VOID and of NO EFFECT and that order took effect from 13 October 1987. 

MY OPINION:-
It is a waste of the time for the PDRM to investigate an offence pursuant to a law - s.298A Penal Code - that has been declared by the then highest court of Malaysia to be of "no effect".

RELATED ISSUES:-
In light of what has happened at Tangkak, Johor, I reread the 10-point solution explanation by Idris Jala. Two key points are as follows:-

1. "The act of “propagation” is the crux of the matter. While the 10-Point Solution allows Christians and churches to use the ALKITAB, which contains some of the 34 prohibited words, the 10-Point Solution does not condone the ACT OF “PROPOGATION” of non-Muslim faiths to Muslims."

2. "In summary, the 10-Point Solution permits the ALKITAB, conditionally in Peninsular Malaysia but unconditionally in Sabah and Sarawak."

Fact 1: A hymnal is not an Al-Kitab.
Therefore, the 10-point solution is in no way applicable to the facts of this case.

Nothing in the given facts of the case indicate that Cyril was doing anything more than ordering copies of the hymnal to be made at the photocopy shop - to be used during Christmas by his Orang Asli congregation (who use BM as the language of service), i.e. there was NO PROPOGATION of Christianity by Cyril to Muslims.

Note: Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution is crystal clear: "STATE LAW and in respect of the Federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, federal law may control or restrict the PROPOGATION of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam."

Fact 2: There does not seem to be a similar provision in Johor that prohibits the use of the term "Allah" by non-Muslims (as there is in Selangor), 
i.e. Section 9 of the Enakmen Kawalan dan Sekatan Pengembangan Agama-Agama Bukan Islam 1991 [Johor] IS NOT THE SAME AS Section 9 of the Enakmen Ugama Bukan Islam (Kawalan Pengembangan Di Kalangan Orang Islam) 1988 [Selangor]. 

DEDUCTION:-
I can hazard a guess, in my limited capacity, of what might happen with the Johor hymnal case. 

The most likely conclusion would be the eventual return of the hymnals to Cyril Mannayagam. 

There may perhaps be, in the future, an amendment to the Johor Enactment to specify words that cannot be used by non-Muslims, as has been done in Selangor (see s.9 read together with the 1st Schedule of the Selangor Enanctment).


REFERENCES:-


- Idris Jala's 24 Feb 2014 statement - http://idrisjala.my/take-allah-issue/



Jason Kay
Melaka
17 December 2014

=======

UPDATE:-
Police return Christian hymnals to Johor priest
18 December 2014

Sunday, 5 October 2014

On Statutory Rape in Malaysia

Firstly, let me start with the fact that I have the utmost respect for Datuk Paduka Marina Mahathir. To me, she is a shining example of what it is to be Malaysian. Her work over the years stands as a testament to the strength of her character, and the fullness of her heart.
Therefore, it was shocking for me to read her views regarding statutory rape in her "Musings" column titled "A mockery of statutory rape law", which appeared on September 11, 2014 in The Star.
In it, she started with 2 stories involving 14-year-old girls. It then went to section 376 of the Penal Code, the cases of Nor Afizal Azizan and Chuah Guan Jiu, a comment about movies that use rape as a plot device, and then she touched on the Kota Kinabalu case of Riduan Masmud (though his name was not mentioned), and a somewhat messy denouement.
I must protest.
Lumping together the cases of Nor Afizal Azizan, Chuah Guan Jiu and Riduan Masmud grossly glosses over the different facts of each case (save for the most prominent one, i.e., that the girls in all 3 cases were under-16), and the prevailing law of the land.
Yes, rape is about violence. That is true. Yes, statutory rape (sex with a minor who is legally not able to give consent to the act of sex) is both illegal and reprehensible. But the situation is not as black and white as the column suggests.
Let's start with consent. In Malaysian law, section 375 of the Penal Code  (PC) says that sex with a woman without her consent (among other things) is rape. If consent is obtained by threats or deception, it is not a valid consent; and if sex ensues, it is rape. This is the simple summary of the law on rape.
If the woman is under-16, then the law deems any sexual intercourse with her as "rape," even if she consented. That is why the term used is "statutory" rape. It means that under statute (the law passed by Parliament), when a girl under-16 says "yes" to sex, the law still considers it rape, and the man who has sex with her can be charged with rape (and most likely will be found guilty if the element of "penetration" is proven).
This issue of consent affects both conviction and sentencing.
For conviction, the key question during a statutory rape trial is, "Did the man have sex with a girl under-16?" If the answer is yes, then he will be convicted of statutory rape.
After the issue of conviction is dealt with, the issue of sentencing arises. The important issue in sentencing is this: What is the appropriate sentence for the man who has been convicted of statutory rape?
The issue of "adequacy of sentence" often riles the public up for cases of statutory rape. Most of the time, he perception is, "that's too lenient." This perception is fuelled by the - sometimes incorrect - view that the young girl was a victim of the lust of an older man who took advantage of a naïve and innocent young girl. That is the usual view that plays in our minds when the term "statutory rape" is mentioned.
It is not an accurate view.
It does not always reflect reality. 

Not all statutory rape cases are about a girl/woman walking down the road, getting pulled into the bushes/vehicle, getting raped and beaten and then left like garbage after the act. These kinds of rape (whether statutory or not) would attract sentences that are retributive or deterrent. No one would argue if the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment (and caning) closer to the maximum in this scenario. Normal reasonable members of society would want it. I would want it.

But what of the statutory "rape" that happens when, say, the girl is 15, the boy is 16, they love each other, and start experimenting with sex? No violence, no coercion; just hormones. This happens everyday. The only reason the word "rape" is used is because under the laws of Malaysia, the girl cannot give consent because of her age, and therefore any sexual encounter she has will be deemed as "rape" in the eyes of the law. The boy has no defence. He is guilty of "rape" as defined by the law.
This is where the element of consent, and judges' discretion, comes into play: during sentencing. The law recognizes that an offence has been committed. The boy is guilty of rape. He will have a criminal record to his name. That's a given. But whether he will be given a slap on the wrist, or community service, or spend time in reform school, or go to prison (with or without caning) depends on the 6 key factors listed below (among other factors that I will not list in full here, in the interest of brevity). The judge will weigh both the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case, and decide what is the most appropriate sentence in light of the particular facts in that case.
Some key factors that the court will consider are as follows:-
  1. Was there violence used?
  2. Is this his first offence?
  3. What is his age? [Children, i.e. those under 18 years old, get special consideration from the court because they are governed by the Child Act 2001  which has the stated purpose of "rehabilitation" in the preamble.]
  4. Did she get pregnant? Did she give birth? What happened to the child?
  5. Were they boyfriend and girlfriend?
  6. Was the victim willing (Did she give her consent)?
For example, in Nor Afizal Azizan  and Chuah Guan Jiu, both girls willingly had sex with the men. There was no force nor violence. And the men were not all that much older than the girls - Nor Afizal was 6 years older while Chuah was 10 years older. These factors can, in law, be valid reasons why the sentence imposed on the boys/young men would be lenient rather than harsh.

For the record, only Nor Afizal was ultimately given a bond of good behaviour. Chuah Guan Jiu, who was initially allowed the bond by the Sessions' Court, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment by the High Court on an appeal by the prosecution. Both have criminal records for rape now. Only Nor Afizal did not go to jail.
To further illustrate on the issue of adequacy of sentence for statutory rape cases, section 376(2)(e) PC specifically states that, for rape, there must be a minimum sentence of 5 years imprisonment if the girl is under-12. However, section 376(2)(d) PC, by implication, provides that if the girl is under-16 (i.e. between 12 and 16) and she consented to the sex, then the court is not obliged to imposed that minimum 5 years sentence of imprisonment. The Penal Code itself makes the distinction between the different ages of teenage girls and their ability to consent. This is a good thing. It acknowledges that young teens (under-12) and older teen girls are different, and it allows judges the discretion in sentencing when the victim is an older teen girl.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Nor Afizal also took pains to note that,  
"Each case depends on its own facts and it is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to lay down any fixed sentence that is meant to govern this type of cases. Therefore, these observations made by this court should not be misconstrued as intending to have blanket application or applying to all cases involving young offenders charged with the similar offence ... In the present case, if the appellant had been older, or he had used force, coercion or violence on the victim, or he had tricked the victim into submitting to him or he had not cooperated with the police and he had not shown any remorse to his act or there is no guarantee that he will not be committing the same offence in the future, we would not have any hesitation, as we have done in many other cases of similar nature, to impose a lengthy custodial sentence. But before us is a young boy who was extremely remorseful for what he had done and had thrown himself to the mercy of the court by pleading guilty to the charge."
Trial judges in statutory rape trials have, and should always have, a wide discretion because they can appreciate the various factors that come into play for sentencing for different accused in statutory rape cases.
When we consider the case of Riduan Masmud, the factors are different. The girl did not consent. He was much older than her - she was 12, he was 41. He even tried to pay off her father. She had to stop her schooling. These factors weighed very heavily against him and that was why upon conviction he was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment plus 2 strokes of the cane. (He is currently free on bail as has appealed to the High Court against both conviction and sentence. The appeal is fixed on September 29.)
One other factor that most lay people do not understand are the principles of sentencing. In brief, there are different reasons for sentencing. If a crime is violent and there are many aggravating factors (like cruelty, repeat offender, or premeditation), or protection of public interest, then sentences would be retributive or deterrent - for example the death penalty for murder, kidnapping for ransom, or drug trafficking. A long jail sentence, usually with whipping, await persons convicted of armed robbery, snatch thefts, or rape that involves violence.
But if the perpetrator is under-18 then, in law, he is a 'child'. The Child Act 2001 comes into play and the 2 guiding principles are that 'sentences' [technically 'order' since even the word 'sentence' is barred from being used by the Act, see section 91(2)] have to be rehabilitative, and in the best interest of the child. A child can still turn over a new leaf. A child can still be given a second chance.
Applying this to the above hypothetical situation where the girl is 15, the boy is 16, the boy would probably be given a bond of good behaviour, and not be sent to jail. This is, to me, a proper sentence. This is a proper resolution to the simple situation of hormonal teenagers in love and experimenting with sex. To put him in jail would doom him needlessly because our collective national morality is "offended" by the thought of hormonal teenagers in love actually experimenting with sex.
So far, my focus has been on the accused. What of the victim of rape/statutory rape? Does the court not think of her before passing sentence? The law remembers her. Upon conviction, there is a Victim Impact Statement that will be made by the victim, or her family, that the court must consider before passing sentence on the man [see section 173(m)(ii) Criminal Procedure Code].
The public has a right to be angry with the crime of rape. It is a heinous crime. It has even been classified as a war crime. But there are varying shades of the offence/crime of rape - how it happens, who are the individuals, what are their motivations, and what is the conclusion that is best in the particular circumstances of each case.
Yes, we should be angry at rape being the punch line of a joke. That should not be acceptable at all. Yes, we should throw the book at old Casanovas/Lotharios who prey on young girls with impunity.
But we should also accept the fact that fully consensual sex with no violence/threats between experimenting teenagers should not attract the same punitive sentence as a rape where the girl/woman was walking down the road, got pulled into the bushes/vehicle, was raped and beaten and then left like garbage after the act. The 2 situations are different. 
– September 28, 2014.
First appeared at: http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/statutory-rape-cases-not-black-and-white-jason-kay